SENTENCING STATEMENTS

 

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PF v Stuart Kennedy

 

Nov 25, 2025

At Perth Sheriff Court, Sheriff Paul Reid imposed a community payback order of 175 hours unpaid work on Stuart Kennedy. Kennedy was also added to the Sex Offenders Register for five years. Following a trial, the offender was found guilty of sexual offence charges including a sexual assault.


On sentencing, Sheriff Reid told Kennedy:

"On 22 March 2024, the Complainer and her closest friends and family gathered at Crieff Hydro to celebrate her hen weekend.  Such an event is meant to be enjoyable, not least for the bride-to-be.  It should never end in a criminal trial. 

Unbeknown to the bride-to-be, and most of the other guests, you had been booked to attend later that evening.  The sister that booked you to attend regretted doing so as soon as you arrived: it was clear that her sister did not want a stripper at her hen weekend.  Things were to get worse. 

Whilst the bride-to-be played along initially, as soon as the routine began it was obvious to all, and should have been obvious to you, that she was not comfortable.  She repeatedly said “no thank you” as you did different parts of your routine.  This included a simulated sex act and other sexualised behaviour.  It is this behaviour which is reflected in Charge 1. 

Whilst others may have been happy to participate or have enjoyed your routine, this bride-to-be did not.  And it was obvious she did not.  Yet you continued.   There followed what was described as a simulated airport-style pat-down during which you touched her breasts.  This is reflected in Charge 2. 

She ran from the room hysterically upset, locked herself in the bathroom and it was clear the routine had come to an end.  You yourself gave evidence that you were concerned that it may be necessary to refund this client.

Your actions that night were criminal and that is reflected in the convictions which have been returned.  It is clear from your evidence during trial, your behaviour as the verdict was read out and the content of the Criminal Justice Social Work report that you do not respect those verdicts. In particular, you continue to deny the assault which constitutes Charge 2.  Your evidence at trial gave the clear impression that you consider yourself to be a, if not the, victim in all of this.  Let me disabuse you of that.

All you had to do that evening was ascertain whether the Complainer was content to participate in the different aspects of your show.  That is neither difficult nor controversial.  Contrary to what is reported in the CJSW Report, it can be readily done by proper communication and responding to the person who is the focus of your show.  The proposition that before performing a sexual act upon another person you have to be satisfied that that person consents is universally acknowledged and accepted.  There is no exception created for you when performing your show.  Your obvious sense of grievance at having come before the criminal courts stems from a misplaced belief that the requirements of consent were disapplied to you and your show.  In no way are you a victim in any of this; you are here simply because you clearly did not consider the law (a basic and uncontroversial one at that) did not apply to you.

I should also make clear that this verdict is not a verdict on the sort of services you provide more generally.  It is a verdict upon you.  You did not obtain consent for what you did.  You did not respond to or recognise that the subject of your routine did not consent.  You decided to carry on regardless. And you decided, in the face of an obviously distressed bride-to-be, to sexually assault her by grabbing her breasts in front of her closest friends and family.  She was meant to be having fun and she ought to have felt safe.  It shows a remarkable disregard for the Complainer and her autonomy that you clearly thought you could do that and face no consequence.

Ultimately this case, and this verdict, is no comment or reflection upon those that offer similar entertainment services.  It is simply a reflection, and reaffirmation, of the basic, uncontroversial and near-universally accepted truth: if you grab a woman’s breasts without her consent you commit a crime.  For all that your evidence sought to dress this case up as being about the challenges faced by those providing similar services it was about nothing more than that basic proposition.

I turn to the sentence that I will impose for these offences.  I should start by explaining how I will treat the two charges.  I propose to impose a single, cumulative, sentence for both offences.  Given they arise out of the same situation and essentially reflect different points in a single course of events, in my view, it is appropriate to take them together for the purposes of sentencing.  If it is not already apparent, it should become apparent, that I consider Charge 2 to be materially more serious.

I have listened carefully to what has been said on your behalf this morning and have considered in detail the Criminal Justice Social Work Report that has been obtained.  That report is helpful in arriving at a sentence.  But it does have some concerning aspects.  In particular, your continued denial of Charge 2, the assertion that you believe the Complainer “may have imagined” you touching her breasts (a proposition which is untenable in light of the cogent evidence heard at trial) and your view that the Complainer “playing an active role” in the show (another entirely untenable proposition given the evidence heard at trial) gave the impression of consent.  You are recorded as “assuming at the time that [the Complainer] was relatively comfortable” with your actions.  That is too is untenable: her evidence, and that of those who were also present, was clearly of someone who was anything but “relatively comfortable”.  You cannot reasonably and in good faith have believed that.  Overall, the Report conveys an impression of continued denial of the offences and a concerning lack of insight despite having sat through the clear and cogent evidence that was led at trial.

Any sentence requires to be fair and proportionate (Principles and Purposes of Sentencing, Sentencing Guideline) and serve the purposes of, amongst other things, protection of the public, punishment and expressing disapproval of the offending behaviour.  I have to start by assessing the seriousness of the offence. 

I do that by considering your culpability and the harm that you caused.  There is significant culpability in respect of Charge 2: it was a deliberate act and you were, at best, indifferent to whether the Complainer consented.  In fact, on the evidence I have accepted, it ought to have been obvious to you that there was no question of the Complainer consenting.  Deliberately touching a woman’s breasts without her consent is an inherently serious matter. The circumstances in which you touched the Complainer’s breasts does not detract from the seriousness of it.  If anything, it aggravates it.  You essentially did this for the entertainment of others and, frankly, humiliated her in front of her closest friends and family.  And when doing so you cannot reasonably have believed she did consent. 

The culpability of Charge 1 is lesser but still material.  As that part of your routine progressed, it ought to have become clearer to you that the Complainer was uncomfortable and did not consent to the sexualised aspects of it.  Rather than toning things down, you escalated them.

As to harm, the second charge (sexual assault) was a deliberate act which humiliated the Complainer in front of her closest family and friends. It was a gross violation of her autonomy arising from your lack of respect for that autonomy.  It was clear from your evidence that you considered it the Complainer’s responsibility to withdraw consent. And absent that, you effectively considered yourself to have licence to do whatever was part of your act. Leaving aside the fact her repeatedly saying “no thank you” did not convey that message to you, you fundamentally do not accept it was your responsibility to have sought and obtained consent.  What you did clearly caused her significant and immediate distress.  It also ruined what was meant to be a special and fun weekend in advance of her wedding. 

For those reasons, I consider these offences, when taken together, to be towards the upper end of the range of seriousness in summary proceedings for offences such as these.

I next have to consider the appropriate sentencing range.  Taken in isolation, in my view, the threshold for a custodial sentence is passed.  That is a direct consequence of my conclusion on the seriousness of the offending, the need for punishment and the need to express disapproval of the offending behaviour. 

You benefit, however, from two statutory presumptions. 

First, because you have never served a sentence of imprisonment before Parliament has directed (in s.204(2) of the 1995 Act) that I may only impose a sentence of imprisonment if no other method of dealing with you is appropriate. 

Secondly, in summary proceedings the maximum period of imprisonment that may be imposed is 12 months.  However, Parliament has also directed (s.204(3A) of the 1995 Act) that a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 12 months or less may only be imposed if no other method of dealing with you is appropriate. 

I have also had regard to the fact you have decided not to continue in this line of work and so the risk of re-offending is substantially reduced.

Finally, I have had regard to the fact that you have two children, both of whom you have, based on the limited information before me, material caring responsibilities.  For my part, accepting that I have not had the benefit of full submissions on the point, I consider this sentencing exercise to be a “relevant function” for the purposes of the UNCRC Incorporation Act.  It is unlawful for the Court to act in a manner incompatible with the UNCRC requirements where it is exercising a “relevant function”.  There is no information before me about how your caring responsibilities would be covered in the event a custodial sentence is imposed today or how the inevitable disruptive effect of a custodial sentence would be managed in respect of either child.  Had I concluded that there was no other method of dealing with you other than a custodial sentence, I would have further deferred sentence for any issues arising from the UNCRC requirements to be addressed.

As it is, I have concluded that it cannot be said that there is no other method of dealing with you other than a custodial sentence.  In reaching that view, the interests of your children were a material factor.  I am satisfied that the non-custodial sentence I plan to impose can lawfully be imposed on the limited information available about your children. 

As a direct alternative to custody, I sentence you to a community payback order with an unpaid work requirement of 175 hours, to be completed within 6 months of today’s date.  I considered the imposition of a Restriction of Liberty Order for a period of three months but decline to do so given the absence of information in respect of the children. It is unnecessary to defer further to obtain that information as an unpaid work order can be imposed.  As I said, this order is a direct alternative to a custodial sentence.

I have already made you subject to the notification requirements of the sexual offenders legislation.  The consequence of the sentence I have just imposed is that I now direct that you be subject to those requirements for a period of 5 years.  That will be backdated to 30 September 2025, when you were convicted and first made subject to these requirements.

That is all."

25 November 2025